## Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000300030004-5

## INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

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IN ACCOUNT
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25X1A6a

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25X1X6 NORTH VIETNAM/CHINA. COUNTRY: FEBRUARY 1967 DOI: O VIEW OF IMPOSSIBILITY OF NORTH VIETNAMESE SUBJECT: 25X1X6 NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT CHINA'S APPROVAL DUE TO NORTH VIETNAMESE DEPENDENCE ON CHINA FOR RICE 25X1A6a 25X1A6a (2MAR 67) ACQ:  $^{\circ}$ SOURCE: O 25X1X6

25X1X6

25X1X6

1. (SUMMARY. OFFICIALS IN HANOI BELIEVE THAT

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT NEGOTIATE WITH THE

UNITED STATES WITHOUT COMMUNIST CHINA'S APPROVAL SINCE NORTH

VIETNAM DEPENDS ON CHINA FOR ONE HALF OF HER RICE SUPPLY. 

BELIEVE THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS

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25X1A2g

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	diagrification) (diagrim controls)
w	QUITE CONCERNED OVER THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CHINA WHICH
0	COULD RESULT IN DIMINISHED RICE EXPORTS AND BECOME A BLOW
	TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMY, MORE SERIOUS THAT THE AMERICAN
(C) 25X1X6	BOMBING. BELIEVE THAT UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES
	NEGOTIATIONS ARE IMPOSSIBLE AND ARE FURTHER CONVINCED THAT
	ULTIMATELY THE UNITED STATES MUST BARGAIN WITH CHINA, WHICH
() 5X1X6	ALSO VIEW AS IMPOSSIBLE UNTIL MAO TSE TUNG DIES
0	OR IS REMOVED FROM POWER).
25X1X	6 2. HANOI BELIEVE THAT THE NORTH
0	VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS MUCH MORE WORRIED ABOUT THE CURRENT
0	SITUATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA THAT THE AMERICAN BOMBINGS.
O <sub>g</sub>	THE PRIMARY REASON FOR THIS CONCERN IS THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
	DEPEND HEAVILY ON CHINA FOR THEIR RICE SUPPLY, HALF OF WHICH
O	COMES FROM CHINA. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FEAR THAT A CONTINUA-
O	TION OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN CHINA MAY RESULT IN
	DISRUPTION OF NORMAL SUPPLY LINES AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY WITH
0	A CONSEQUENT DIMINSZHING OF RICE EXPORTS WHICH COULD BE A -
C	SERIOUS, IF NOT CRIPPLING, BLOW TO NORTHE VIETNAM. 25X1X6
	OFFICIALS IN HANOI HAVE FOUND THAT THE AMERICAN BOMBINGS
( )	HAVE CAUSED UNEXPECTEDLY HEAVY DAMAGE ALTHOUGH THIS HAS NOT

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•	City in Contract
	(classification)

MATERIALLY DAMAGED THE WAR EFFORT.

25X1X6 OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, IF LEFT TO THEIR OWN DECISION, MIGHT BE WILL TO NEGOTIATE. -PARTICULARLY SINCE THEY WON MANY MATERIAL CONCESSIONS FROM THE FRENCH AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE IN 1954. HOWEVER, AS A CONSEQUENCE OF DEPENDENCE ON CHINA FOR ITS FOOD SUPPLY, THERE IS NO CHANCE THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WILL NEGOTIATE WITH THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT CHINESE CONCURRENCE. THEREFORE. 25X1X6 SINCE BELIEVE THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE IMPOSSIBLE. GIVEN CURRENT CHINESE INTRANSIGENCE. 25X1X6 WILL DO NOTHING TO ENCOURAGE NEGOTIATIONS. 25X1X6 ALSO CONVINCED THAT TO NEGOTIATE WITH NORTH VIETNAM THE UNITED STATES MUST ULTIMATELY BARGAIN WITH CHINA, BUT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO FIND A COMMON GROUND FOR SUCH BARGAINING UNTIL MAO TSE TUNG DIES OR IS REMOVED FROM POWER. 25X1X6 (SOURCE COMMENT. SAID THAT THE ABOVE REPRESENTS THE OFFICIAL VIEWPOINT ON 25X1X6 THE VIETNAMESE SITUATION.)

DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACTHAI CINCPAC 25X1A6a ARPAC PACAF PACFLT (ALSO SENT 25X1A6a